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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In the instant case, there was a dispute over the accurate amount of
restitution. Consequently, Appellant requested a restitution hearing at sentencing.
In response to this request, the trial court issued an order of restitution but
indicated that the parties should return and request a full hearing if they were
unable to negotiate a resolution.

Sometime later, a hearing was requested in

response to the judge's instruction. The fact that the judge indicated the parties
should request a hearing if negotiations failed, combined with the fact that a
hearing was subsequently requested is in and of itself evidence that negations
failed. Consequently, the state's argument that there is no indication in the record
that negations failed is misplaced.
In addition, Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(5) requires the sentencing court
to consider several factors before it determines restitution and then it must make

the reasons for its decision part of the record. The trial court never considered the
factors when it set the restitution amount and then indicated it would inquire into
all claims at a later date if necessary. Furthermore, the presentence report does not
address each of the statutory factors; consequently, any reliance on the presentence
report in determining restitution does not satisfy the requirements of Utah Code
Ann. § 77-38a-302(5).

ARGUMENT

L THERE IS ADEQUATE SUPPORT IN THE RECORD TO
SUBSTANTIATE APPELLANT'S FIRST CLAIM THAT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED
APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR A RESTITUTION
HEARING.
In the instant case, the record indicates that the office of Adult Probation
and Parole had estimated the amount of restitution to be $131,541.13. (Sent.
Trans, at 5)1. The record further indicates that Appellant disagreed with this
estimation.

Appellant believed that at least $76,000.00 of the restitution amount

went to benefit the alleged victim, the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control
(DABC), and, consequently, the actual restitution amount should be much lower.
(Sent. Trans, at 5). As a result of this disagreement, Mr. Harms stated, "we'd be
asking the court to set a restitution hearing."2 (Sent. Trans, at 5).
1

The sentencing transcript is found in the record at page 90.
The use of the word "we" in this context indicates that Mr. Harms was speaking on behalf of the State and
Appellant.

2

2

Recognizing this dispute, the court initially set restitution in the amount of
$131,541.13, "until such time and if that number is modified by this Court."
(Sent. Trans, at 6). Furthermore, the court noted that "[i]f there is no satisfactory
conclusion by either party [regarding the amount of restitution], then you're to
notify this Court, [ ], and I will set the matter for an evidentiary hearing." (Sent.
Trans, at 7).
Subsequently, Mr. Rasmussen withdrew as counsel for Appellant (R. 52)
and John Hutchison filed an appearance of counsel as his replacement (R. 55).3
When Mr. Hutchison was retained as counsel, restitution was still set at
$131,541.13 reflecting the failed negotiations between Appellant and the State. (R.
50).

Appellant disagreed with this restitution amount from the outset and

indicated as much to the court. (Sent. Trans, at 5). Consequently, when the State
did not adjust that figure, negotiations failed and Appellant, as instructed by the
court, gave notice of his need for a restitution hearing.4 (R. 55).
The State asserts that "[n]o one informed the trial court at any time
thereafter that negotiations occurred or that they had reached 'no satisfactory
conclusion'". (Appellee Br. at 15). However, this assertion is inaccurate. The
trial court instructed Defendant to notify the court if negotiations failed, and,
3

As evidence that negotiations were successful, the State references the fact that Mr. Rasmussen withdrew
as Appellant's counsel before requesting a restitution hearing. However, this assertion ignores that fact that
Appellant hired substitution counsel who immediately applied for a restitution hearing and during oral
arguments indicated Appellant had the same problems with the restitution amount that he'd had during
sentencing.
4
The fact that a presentence report was made by adult probation and parole does not substitute for
Appellant's right to have a restitution hearing conducted on his behalf when he requests one at sentencing.
A restitution hearing allows defendants an opportunity to present evidence contrary to the presentence
report and otherwise present mitigating factors in favor of a lowered restitution amount.

3

consequently, John Hutchison notified the court by filing Appellant's motion for a
restitution hearing. In the motion, Mr. Hutchison expressed Appellant's desire to
force the State to prove how it calculated the restitution amount.

(R. 55)

Furthermore, during the restitution hearing, Mr. Hutchison further notified the
court of the failed negotiations when he reiterated the identical concerns Appellant
had with the restitution amount at the time of sentencing, namely that he was not
getting credit for the $76,000.00 that went to the benefit of DABC. (Rest. Hear, at
4)5. Specifically, Mr. Hutchison stated that, "we want, number one, obviously to
get some sort of relief over the $25,000.00 that we say has been repaid, and also,
some sort of set-off or possession of the items which were required to pay for of
the personalty nature." (Rest. Hear, at 4). Consequently, Mr. Hutchison informed
the court that negotiations had not been successful when he pointed out that
Appellant was not able to negotiate a satisfactory restitution amount. Specifically,
the restitution amount had not changed since the time of sentencing, indirectly
indicating that the State had refused to alter the restitution amount.
In conclusion, the record supports Appellant's claim that the trial court
erred when it denied his request for a restitution hearing. The sentencing hearing
transcript shows that Appellant requested a restitution hearing at sentencing. The
trial court indicated that it preferred for the two parties to negotiate on a restitution
amount; however, if they were unable to reach a satisfactory conclusion then
Appellant could return to court and an evidentiary hearing would be conducted on
5

The restitution hearing is found in the record at page 92.

4

his behalf. The State was unwilling to adjust the restitution figure to a satisfactory
amount. As a result, Appellant, at the direction of the court, returned to the judge
and asked him to schedule the promised restitution hearing.

When the judge

denied Appellant's request, he did so in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a302(4), which guarantees any defendant a restitution hearing when one is
requested at sentencing.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ADEQUATELY
CONSIDER ANY OF THE REQUIRED FACTORS OR
STATE ITS REASONS FOR THE RESTITUTION
AMOUNT.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302 provides several statutory factors, which

courts must consider before they may impose restitution. The language of the
Code does not require the sentencing court to explicitly note on the record each
factor listed in the aforementioned section; however, it does require the court to at
least consider each factor and then "make the reasons [for its restitution decision]
part of the court record." State v. Smith, 475 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, ^[29, 72 P.3d 692,
701 (Utah App. 2003); State v. Weeks, 458 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, f22, 61 P.3d 1000,
1006 (Utah 2002); State v. Hasten, 81] P.2d 929, 936 (Utah App. 1991); Utah
Code Ann. § 77~38a-302(3). Furthermore, when the sentencing court does not
specifically mention which factors it considered, an appellate court can assume the
sentencing court considered the required factors if to do so would be reasonable.
Weeks, Utah Adv. Rep. at \ 24, 61 P.3d at 1006-07.

5

a. The Trial Court did not Adequately Consider All the Statutory
Factors when Appellant was not Given an Opportunity to
Present Evidence Pertaining to those Factors.
In the instant case, the trial court set the restitution amount without
considering any of the statutory factors on the record. Furthermore, it is not
reasonable to assume that the trial court considered the statutory factors.

It

appears the trial court hoped that the State and Appellant would be able to
negotiate a restitution amount.

(See Sent. Trans, at 7).

However, the court

specifically noted that if they were not able to reach a "satisfactory conclusion"
then it would set the matter for an evidentiary hearing "[a]t which time, all of the
claims [would] be inquired into and a determination [would] be made." (Sent.
Trans, at 7). Consequently, it is not reasonable to assume that the trial court
considered the statutory factors when it imposed restitution; instead, it is
reasonable to assume that it intended to consider the statutory factors at a later
date, if necessary.
The State's argument rests on its assertion that the trial court properly
considered all the statutory factors because it relied on the presentence report.
(Appellee Br. at 21, 23). However, in the instant case, Appellant was not given an
opportunity to present evidence to contradict the findings of the presentence
report; consequently, even if the trial court relied on the presentence report in
determining restitution, it does not follow that it adequately considered each of the

6

statutory factors where Appellant was not permitted to present evidence relating to
those factors.6
At the outset it is important to note that Appellant never agreed with the
presentence report's findings regarding the restitution amount. Any references the
State makes regarding Appellant's "praise of the report's content" occurred with
regard to the prison sentence that was recommended in the report. Appellee Br. at
23; (Sent. Trans, at 3-4). Appellant disagreed with the restitution amount and the
manner by which it was determined from the outset of this case. (Sent. Trans, at
5).
In Appellee's brief, the State cites Weeks, for its authority that the trial
court is allowed to rely on the presentence report when making its restitution
determination as evidence it considered the statutory factors. (Appellee Br. at 2223).

However, as stated in Appellant's opening brief, the instant case is

distinguished from Weeks for several reasons. Most importantly, in Weeks, the
sentencing court held a restitution hearing to determine the amount of restitution
which was to be paid by the defendant. However, at the hearing, the defendant
chose not present any evidence to rebut the restitution amount suggested by the
state. Consequently, the court relied on the presentence report, as well as other
factors, to determine the restitution amount. Weeks, 458 Utah Adv. Rep. at ^f 6, 61
P.3d at 1002.

However, in Weeks, the court specifically recognized the

6

When the trial court indicated it would look into all of the claims if negotiations failed, intimating that
Appellant would be permitted to present evidence at a restitution hearing if one was necessary. Moreover,
information regarding the statutory factors and contesting the presentence report is generally taken during a
restitution hearing. See State v. Corbitt, 2003 UT App 417, 82 P.3d 211 (Utah App. 2003).
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defendant's right to challenge the figures cited in the presentence report and relied
upon by the State. Id. at \ 20, 1005.
Contrary to Weeks, in the instant case, the trial court did not give Appellant
an opportunity to present evidence regarding the restitution amount nor was he
given an opportunity to refute the findings made in the presentence report. As a
result, Appellant was also denied an opportunity to address the statutory factors
listed in the Code, and, consequently, the court was not able to adequately
consider those statutory factors.
b. The Trial Court did not Consider All of the Statutory Factors
when the Presentence Report on Which it Solely Relied did
not Discuss All of the Factors.
In the alternative, contrary to the State's assertion, it appears the
presentence report fails to address all of the factors listed in Utah Code Ann. § 7738a-302(5)(c). (See State's Addendum C). The language of the Code requires the
sentencing court to at least consider each of the factors listed in the
aforementioned subsection. State v. Smith, 475 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 at If 29, 72 P.3d
692, 701 (Utah App. 2003)(emphasis added). The State alleges that the report
addresses all the factors because it discusses "defendant's 'stable life,' 'substantial
incoming retirement,' and detailed household income and financial obligation
information" (Appellee Br. at 23); however, this information does not adequately
take into account "the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of
restitution". Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(5)(c)(iii).

Consequently, the

presentence report does not analyze all of the statutory factors listed in Utah Code
8

Ann. § 77-38a-302(5). As a result, the trial court's reliance on the presentence
report does not satisfy the requirement that it consider each of the statutory factors
listed in the Code. State v. Smith, 475 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 at 129, 72 P.3d 692, 701
(Utah App. 2003)(emphasis added).
In conclusion, the trial court failed to follow the mandates of Utah Code
Ann. § 77-38a-302 when it failed to consider all of the statutory factors and it
failed to make the reasons for its decision part of the record. The presentence
report does not accurately take into account all of the statutory factors that the
court is required to consider, or, in the alternative, all of the statutory factors were
not adequately considered when the court denied Appellant the opportunity to
present evidence regarding those factors.

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant/Defendant, RICHARD PEARSON,
respectfully asks this Court to reverse the order refusing the restitution hearing and
REMAND this case back to the trial court for a full hearing in compliance with
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302.

9

REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
Counsel for Appellant requests oral argument in the above referenced
matter.

RESPECTUFLLY SUBMITTED this ZZUday of August, 2005.

YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ
Attorneys for Defendant

By. /
PFiTERD. GOOD ALL
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I hereby declare that I caused to be mailed/delivered two true and correct
copies of the foregoing Appellant's Reply Brief, postage prepaid, this ^<t~^ day
of August, 2005, to the following:
Kris Leonard
Assistant Attorney General
Bever M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-0854
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